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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In People v. Whitlock" the court said that before the evidence
of trailing by a bloodhound could be introduced, there must be a
testimonial sponsor to lay a proper foundation for its introduction.
It must be shown that the dog was trained and tested in the track-
ing of human beings, by experience had been found reliable in
such cases, and that the dog was laid on the trail, whether visible
or invisible, at a point where the circumstances clearly showed the
guilty party had been. The reliability of the dog must be proved
by persons having personal knowledge of his tracking ability and
may be strengthened by proof of pedigree, purity of blood, or
the exalted standing of his breed and performance.2 0
In Buck v. State2 ' the Oklahoma Court adopted the above
precautionary methods of admitting the evidence and went further
by saying that before introduction of evidence of trailing is heard,
the trial court should hear testimony of witnesses out of the pres-
ence of the jury, as to blood, training and experience and determine
as a matter of law whether it is such as to permit the introduction
of the evidence to the jury.
Courts adhering to the view that bloodhound evidence is ad-
missible concede that such evidence is to be accepted with caution
and is not, under any circumstance, to be regarded as conclusive
evidence of guilt.22 It is generally held that this class of evidence
is cumulative or corroborative only and not sufficient by itself to
support a conviction.2 3 Those jurisdictions where such evidence is
excluded altogether, statements are frequently found that blood-
hound evidence is of little probative value and is not looked upon
with favor.24
The use of bloodhound or police dog evidence would be more
probative and occupy a more useful function in criminal courts if
it were limited to cases where the criminal had, as Wigmore sug-
gests, left behind some identifying object. Where the courts depart
from this and allow police dogs to indiscriminately select defend-
ants by sniffing microscopic particles of effluvia, the evidence
comes very near to passing justice Douglas' "Puke Test."
Don E. Cummings
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: SUBivIISSION OF A PLAINTIFF
TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY ORDER OF TRIAL COURT
In late 1962, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma overruled more
than a half century of prior decisions upon the question of whether
39 People v. Vhitlock, 183 App.Div. 482, 171 N.Y.S. 109 (Sup.Ct. 1918).
20 Ibid.
21 Buck v. State, 77 Okla. Grim. 17, 138 P.2d 115 (1943).
22 State v. Fixley, 118 Kan. 1, 233 Pac. 796 (1925).
23 Meyers v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 523, 240 S.W. 71 (1922).2 4 Hayes v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 716, 277 S.W. 1004 (1925); Fisher
v. State, 150 Miss. 206, 116 So. 746 (1928).
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a trial court can order a plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries
to submit to a physical examination. In Witte v. Fullerton, 876 P.2d
244 (Okla. 1962), the Oklahoma court held that upon a timely
request from the defendant, the trial court had the discretionary
power to require the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination.
Thus, Oklahoma adopted the rule of most jurisdictions.'
Prior to the Fullerton decision, the Oklahoma courts had fol-
lowed the rule established in 1903 in City of Kingfisher v. Altizer,2
that held that the courts of this state could not require a plaintiff
to submit to a medical examination either before or during the
trial. This view stemmed from a Supreme Court decision in Union
Pac. Ry. v. Botsford.3
In Botsford, the Court held that a federal court could not
order the physical examination of a party in the absence of any
statutory authority. The reasoning of the majority stressed the basic
idea of the sanctity of the person. Justice Gray, writing for the
majority, said: "No right is held more sacred or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference of others . . .4
After the Botsford and Altizer decisions, the Oklahoma courts
continued to adhere strictly to the rule established in those cases;5
even though many jurisdictions began to adopt the opposite of the
decision of the Botsford case by statute," or by the decisions of
their highest courts.7 They made only one exception to this rule.
In the case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Ransdell,8 the court held that if a
plaintiff offers his body into evidence,, then he may not thereafter
decline to submit to a physical examination.0
18 WimorE, EVIDExcE § 2220 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); See Annot.,
51 A.L.R. 183 (1927); supplemented by 108 A.L.R. 142 (1937).
213 Okla. 121, 74 Pac. 107 (1903).
3141 U.S. 250 (1891).41d. at 251.
5 Oklahoma By. v. Thomas, 63 Okla. 219, 164 Pac. 120 (1917); Atchi-
son T. & S.F. By. v. Melson, 40 Okla. 1, 134 Fac. 388 (1913).
6Eg., Amuz. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4468 (Struckmeyer, 1928); FLA. CoUP.
GEN. LAws § 7054 (1927); N. J. REv. STAT. § 2.99-1 (1937); WASH. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1230-1231 (Remington, 1932).
7 Jolmston v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 535, 89 Pac. 348 (1907);
Brown v. Hotzler Bros. Co., 152 Md. 39, 136 AUt. 30 (1927); S.S. Kresge Co.
v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N.E. 611 (1931); Carnine v. Tibbetts,
158 Ore. 21, 74 P.2d 974 (1937).
8 180 Okla. 203, 69 P.2d 69 (1937).
9Id. at 205, 69 P.2d at 71 the court stated: "While the courts are in
disagreement as to the authority to require a plaintiff to submit to an exam-
ination in the first instance, they are in practical unanimity with respect to
the rule to be followed when the plaintiff has offered a portion of his body
in evidence, and hold that the same then becomes an exhibit in the case,
and that within reasonable limitations the opposite party has the right to
make such inspection of it as will enable him to explain, criticize or impeach
its value as evidence and to that end, have it examined by experts."
[Vol. 1, No. 2
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The adoption of Federal Rule 85 (a) in 1938,10 and the de-
cision upholding its constitutionality," seemed to cause the court
to adopt a new course. In subsequent cases, where a defendant
sought a physical examination of the plaintiff the court either af-
firmed, without discussion, citing Altizer and similar cases,12 or
the court evaded the question by stating that the request of the
defendant had come too late in the proceedings. 13
In 1960, in Transport Ins. Co. v. McAlister,14 the court ap-
proached the problem from the position that the court had no in-
herent power to order a plaintiff to submit to a physical examina-
tion. The court said that this problem was one to be resolved by
the Oklahoma legislature rather than by the courts.
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, gave a clear indica-
tion of what the law would eventually be in Oklahoma. He agreed
with the majority rule on the question, and added that the main
reason for the minority rule had almost completely disappeared
over the years.'5 Justice Jackson also stated that in the future the
court should apply the majority rule in similar cases.16
Two years later the court was confronted with the same prob-
lem in the Fullerton case. The defendant in this action was denied
his request that the trial court require plaintiff to submit to a
physical examination by a physician to be selected by the court.
The defendant based his appeal on the argument that without such
examination he could not determine the true nature and extent of
plaintiff's injuries.
The author of the opinion, Chief Justice Williams, cited the
majority rule and agreed that it was the better view. The court
withdrew the language in the McAlister case, that a changing of
the rule presents a legislative and not a judicial question, and
specifically overruled the Altizer case.
But the court refused to reverse the trial court in this case
for two reasons. First, the court felt the McAlister case did not
give sufficient warning to the attorneys and judges of this state
that a change of holding by the court would occur in the near
10 FEn. R. Civ. P.35(a), which provides: "In an action in which the
mental or physical condition of a party is irt controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental ex-
amination by a physiican ......
". Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
12 Law v. Corsin, 206 Okla. 151, 244 P.2d 831 (1952).
13Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. Stine, 280 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1955); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Myers, 202 Okla. 151, 210 P.2d 944 (1949). In this later
case, justice Gibson, in a dissent, spoke in favor of the adoption of the
majority rule.
14 355 P.2d 576 (Okla. 1960).
15 Id. at 582.
16 Id. at 583.
17Witte v. Fullerton, 376 P.2d 244, 248 (Okla. 1962).
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fature; and secondly, that the trial court should not be reversed
for merely relying upon former decisions of this court.18
The shortcoming of the Fullerton case is not that the court
failed to reverse the trial court, but that the court missed an ex-
cellent opportunity to establish some guide lines within which the
trial courts should exercise their discretion. In practically everyjurisdiction which has adopted the majority rule two main prob-
lems have had to be resolved. First, what constitutes a timely re-
quest by the defendant for a physical examination? Secondly, may
the defendant designate the particular physician to examine the
plaintiff?
Had the court reversed the trial court in the Fullerton case,
it would have had to rule on the question of whether the request
of the defendant was timely. The request in the Fullerton case
was tendered to the trial court two weeks before the scheduled
trial. This gave the court an excellent fact situation in respect to
the question of what constitutes a timely request.
Prior to the Fullerton case, the court held in Phillips Petroleum
Company v. Myers"9 and in Oklahoma Transportation Company v.
Stine.20 that defendant's request for a physical examination of the
plaintiff was tendered too late in the proceedings.
In the Myers case, defendant made his request after the com-
mencement of the trial and the court, in affirming the overruling
of the request, 9tated "if such an application, as here, is made after
commencement of the trial, the burden of showing a good excuse
for the delay rests upon the applicant and the application will
rarely be approved when made after the commencement of the
trial."21
In the Stine case, the court considered an identical situation
as the Myers case, but held the request untimely upon different
grounds. In this case, the last pleading had been filed two years
before the commencement of the trial and the court felt that the
defendant had ample time to request a physical examination of the
plaintiff.22
From the Myers and Stine cases, it can be concluded that any
defendant, requesting a physical examination of the plaintiff after
the commencement of the trial, will have to show extremely ggod
cause in order to overcome the untimely nature of his request.
Since Fullerton, another case has been decided in Oklahoma
in which the question of timeliness of request was indirectly re-
18 Ibid. Chief Justice Williams said: "While we agree with the majority
view in principle, we determine that the judgment of the trial court involved
in this appeal should not be reversed because of such courts failure to
follow such view. In so doing the trial court merely relied upon the former
decisions of this court and such action by the trial court is affirmed."
19 202 Okla. 151, 210 P.2d 944 (1949).
20 280 P,2d 1020 (Okla. 1955).
21202 Okla. at 154, 210 P.2d at 949.
22 280 P.2d at 1024.
[Vol. 1, No. 2
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ferred to by the court. In Ellsworth v. Brown,23 the court was
confronted with the problem of a trial court's granting defendant's
request for a physical examination prior to the Fullerton decision.
In Ellsworth, the request of the defendant was tendered at
the pre-trial conference. The trial court granted this request and
the supreme court, in deciding the appeal, did nothing more than
note that the request was tendered at the pre-trial conference. 24
The court had an excellent opportunity to avoid the major issue
raised on appeal by stating that the defendant's request came
too late in the proceedings. The fact that the court did not do this
might indirectly infer that a request for a physical examination,
tendered at the pre-trial conference, is not untimely in the pro-
ceedings. But, the only conclusion that can be drawn from Fuller-
ton and Ellsworth, is that timeliness is still a question to be resolved
in future decisions.
In Fullerton, the defendant called upon the trial court to
designate a physician to examine the plaintiff. On appeal, the
court did not comment as to how a physician should be selected.
May a defendant, in his motion, designate a physician to perform
the examination? This question will certainly be raised in Oklahoma
in the future as there is a diversity of views upon it.
The prevailing view, if there is one, is that the party who
moves for the physical examination has no absolute right to the
choice of physician; but, in lieu of an objection, the court will ap-
point the physician suggested by the moving party.25 The basis
of this principal is that the physician, by the very nature of his
profession, will make a fair and impartial examination, regardless
of which party requests the examination.
But, in a recent North Carolina case, the court stressed that
the trial court should not name a physician suggested by either
party, but should make an independent choice.26 The court reason-
oned that by this procedure it would avoid the appearance of
favoritism to either party.
Not only will the Oklahoma courts have to decide how to se-
lect a physician to perform a physical examination, but they may
have to decide whether one or more physicians may perform the
examination.27 Clearly, this is the age of specialization in medicine
and seldom do serious injuries result to a person that do not require
consultation and treatment by more than one specialist. At the
trial, plaintiff quite naturally brings forth all the specialists that
have examined and treated him. Should a defendant be burdened
23 387 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1963).
24 Id. at 636.
25The Italia, 27 F.Supp. 785, 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).2 6 Helton v. J. P. Stevens Co., 254 N.C. 321, 118 S.E.2d 791 (1961).
27 Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Grady, 90 So.2d 871 (Fla.App. 1958).
The defendant requested that an examination be performed by an ortho-
pedist and a neurosurgeon, but the court held that it would be an abuse
of discretion to permit both to examine the plaintiff.
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and handicapped by being allowed to have only one physician ex-
amine the plaintiff?
The problem of the selection of a physician was partially
resolved in Ellsworth v. Brown, where the court commented at
great length upon the selection of a physician. The defendant re-
quested that he be permitted to name the physician to conduct
the examination. 28 After apparent spirited discussion, the trial court
decided to submit a list of five physicians to both parties. Later,
when the parties failed to agree upon a physician, the court ap-
pointed a physician to conduct the examination." On appeal, the
court gave tacit approval to this method of selecting a physician. 0
Thus, the court established one guide line for trial courts to follow
in the future.
However, there are two facets of this case that lessen the
court's statements, regarding the selection of a physician. First,
the major issue, on appeal, was whether the trial court's granting
of a physical examination materially affected the substantial rights
of the plaintiff. The method of selection of the physician was not
directly involved.31
Secondly, the plaintiff chose to exhibit his injury from the
witness stand; thus, the rule of the Ransdell case was applicable
and the court felt that it was not important that the physician was
chosen to examine the plaintiff before he exhibited his injuries 2
Therefore, this act of the plaintiff, coupled with the major issue of
the appeal, tempers the courts language regarding the selection
of the physician.
Ellsworth, like Fullerton, has its incomplete aspect. The court
again became too preoccupied with the overruling and the ex-
plaining of previous decisions83 and therefore, missed an oppor-
tunity to comment on the major questions involved in a defendant's
request for a physical examination. But, it is encouraging to note
that the court did take the opportunity to comment upon the
selection of the physician. Perhaps, these comments were an indi-
cation that the court intends to resolve the question of timeliness
and selection of a physician in the near future.
William H. Bruckner
28387 P.2d at 636.
29 Ibid.
80 I. at 638.
a' Id. at 635.
32 Id. at 637.
83 Id. at 635-636.
[Vol. 1, No. 2
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